Studies show that misconceptions about psychology are pervasive. This study examined how the strength of prior beliefs and the sources of misinformation relate to conceptual change following an introductory psychology course . Ninety introductory psychology students completed a 36-item "Psychological Information" questionnaire. Testing during the 1 st day of the semester showed 38.5% accuracy whereas testing during the last week showed 66.3% accuracy. These results suggest that misconceptions remain prevalent but can be reduced by taking an introductory psychology course. Our data also indicate that strength of belief is an important transitional variable that may reflect the process of change. Finally, although personal experience and media are important sources of misinformation, we found that they do not promote strongly held beliefs.
for widespread belief in misconceptions concerning human behavior continues to be demonstrated among college students (Brown, 1983; Lamal , 1979 Lamal , , 1995 Messer & Griggs, 1989; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 1999) , as well as among the general public (Science and engineering indicators, 2002) , nonsocial science faculty (Gardner & Hund, 1983) , and cross-culturally (McCutcheon, Furnham, & Davis, 1993) . Furthermore, studies examining the effect of the introductory psychology course on student misconceptions have suggested that there is only limited change in students' false beliefs following instruction. For example, studies by McKeachie (1960) and Vaughn (1977) found only a small decline in misconceptions, 5.5% and 6.6%, respectively. In addition, Gardner and Dalsing (1986) and Kowalski and Taylor (2001) found that even after taking several psychology courses, many students still retain their false beliefs. The only studies we found which showed decreases in misconceptions used refutational text, lecture, and discussion (Miller, Wozniak, Rust, Miller & Slezak, 1996; .
The study of misconceptions is important because research shows that strongly held , but incorrect beliefs, are particularly difficult to change (Otero , 1998; Vosniadou, 2001) . Once misinformation becomes fixed in a person's knowledge base, new information is frequently distorted or ignored, resulting in strengthening or retention of the inaccurate belief. If students are entering the introductory psychology class with strongly held misconceptions, teaching them the more scientifically accurate findings will be particularly difficult.
The conceptual change literature provides extensive evidence that strongly held beliefs are especially difficult to change. Dole and Sinatra (1998) attribute this difficulty to the cognitive effort required to change basic schemata. Dole (2000) additionally provides evidence to suggest that the more strongly held a belief, the more it reduces comprehension of new material , in conflict with the prior belief.
Much of the psychological literature on misconceptions has focused on problems in defining and assessing misconceptions as they relate to human cognition and behavior rather than on the processes underlying change. Recent researchers have criticized early tests of misconceptions, particularly for their reliance on the true/false format.
Several authors (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; McCutcheon, 1991; Ruble, 1986) contend that information in psychology is more complex than a single , simple statement can imply. In addition, true/false-testing fails to discriminate between strongly held misconceptions and answers that result from guessing. Researchers have addressed this issue by including a "don't know" option to account for guessing (Gardner & Dalsing, 1986) , or by altering the test format by creating multiple-choice options (McCutcheon, 1991) . Neither of these alternatives, however, assesses the strength of beliefs.
Viewing psychological misconceptions within the conceptual change framework underscores the importance of assessing the strength of students' beliefs. Not only would such an assessment clarify the guessing issue, such an assessment is also likely to provide information on the processes underlying changing conceptions and beliefs. Both the cognitive literature and the education literature suggest that the metacognitive ability to evaluate one's knowledge (Maki , 1998 : Kruger & Dunning, 1999 , to notice inconsistencies (Otero , 1998) , and to experience dissatisfaction with that knowledge (Posner, Strike, Hewson, & Gertzog, 1982) is critical to conceptual change. Moreover, as Dole and Sinatra (1998) note, the evidence from studying conceptual change in science knowledge and text comprehension suggests that change is gradual and evolutionary rather than being sudden and revolutionary. Changing strength of belief, then, can provide a more sensitive index of slowly changing conceptions.
In addition to the ambiguity inherent in asking students to assess simple true/false statements about complex psychological issues, previous studies on psychological misconceptions have mostly speculated on the sources of misconceptions and have recommended that research assess the sources of misconceptions (Barnett, 1986; Brown, 1984; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Higbee & Clay, 1998; McCutcheon, 1991; Panek, 1982; Ruble, 1986; Vaughn , 1977) . Only the source of prior belief in the 10% myth has been investigated to any great extent (Higbee & Clay, 1998) .
The science education literature suggests that so called "na"ive science" arises from faulty conclusions based on limited personal experiences and observations, social interactions, and inaccurate prior instruction (i.e., Dole, 2000; Qian & Guzzetti, 2000) . If scientific misconceptions are derived from such sources (i.e. , are "na"ive") , then individuals may also develop misconceptions about psychological science from similar sources. These sources may contribute to the persistence of inaccurate beliefs by providing intermittent repeated exposure to perceived supporting evidence, creating both a confirmation bias and a learning schedule that is resistant to change.
The present study investigated several aspects of psychological misconceptions in the context of an introductory psychology course guided by findings from the literature on conceptual change. Our general goal was to assess the ongoing prevalence of psychological misconceptions among students , using an instrument designed to address several criticisms of previous instruments. Specifically we assessed misconceptions that were unambiguous, and which were covered by course content. We also addressed the limitation of the true/false format by assessing the strength of belief for each response. To accomplish this latter objective, participants rated their confidence in each statement. This procedure provided a more sensitive measure of the strength of students' beliefs in misconceptions and allowed for assessment of guessing. We expected confidence ratings to provide an additional measure of conceptual change from pretest to posttest beyond simple absolute accuracy rates.
We also assessed the sources of students' (mis)information, in order to correct the lack of this information in the literature. We expected this information when taking account of strength of belief to allow an assessment of the confidence participants placed in their knowledge, based on the source of their knowledge. Using the conceptual change literature to guide our hypotheses, we predicted that misconceptions would be prevalent and would decline following the introductory course. We also expected that strength of beliefs would provide additional insight into absolute accuracy rates. If change is gradual and evolutionary, then accuracy rates alone may not provide as sensitive a measure of changing beliefs as would changing confidence rates. The effects of guessing, as operationalized in low confidence ratings, could also be accounted for. Finally, we expected that, in general , misconceptions would be derived from personal experiences and mass media sources.
Method

Participants
Ninety introductory psychology students, primarily traditional (immediately out of high school) incoming freshmen, volunteered to complete both the pretest and posttest.
Materials
We developed a 36-item true/false pretest questionnaire assessing misconceptions through previously reported pilot studies Kowalski, Taylor, Freund, & Houldsworth, 2002; Taylor, Kowalski, & Laggren, 2000; Taylor, Kowalski, Negin, & Heise, 2001) . A major goal was to include popular misconceptions of relatively recent origin. Some items were from previous questionnaires (Vaughn, 1977) , some were from readings about psychological myths (Della Salla, 1998; Elkind, 1987; Segal, 1989) , some were directly from course content, and some were directly from various texts and instructors' manuals. All of the items were misconceptions and therefore needed to be answered "false" to be correct. We adopted this format, in which all correct responses are "false," from the most-often cited and replicated previous studies (e.g., Vaughn, 1977) to allow a more direct comparison with the extant data. To address the criticism that simple statements may be ambiguous (e.g., Brown, 1983) , we used pilot testing , peer critique, and published critiques of some items to eliminate items that seemed ambiguous or had insufficient evidence for clear classification as misconceptions.
We also developed a 48-item true/false posttest, including all of the pretest items. There were 12 additional items, phrased to be "true" and randomly intermixed with the pretest items. Only the 36 original items were analyzed.
Participants noted whether they thought each item was true or false; they then also rated the ir confidence in each answer on a 1-10 scale from not at a/l confident (guessing) to vel}' confident. The participants noted, as specifically as possible, where they learned the information by classifying the sources of knowledge into categories, including "media, personal experience, read about it, learned it in a class, don't remember how I learned it, and other-add your own source for this knowledge."
Procedure
Participants provided consent prior to completing the pretest in class during the first class meeting of the fall semester. They completed the posttest in class during the last week of the semester, approximately 15 weeks later. Participants required about 20 minutes to complete each of the questionnaires.
Results
Results are based on analysis of the 36 items that were common to both the pretest and posttest.
Accuracy: What is the Prevalence of Misconceptions?
Mean accuracy at pretest was 38.5% and at posttest 66.3%, with a mean of 11.7 more items answered correctly at posttest. This pretest to posttest accuracy difference was significant, F(1 , 71) = 234.32 , P < .001, eta 2 = .767.
How Does Guessing Affect Performance on the Misconceptions Test?
To determine whether guessing affected overall accuracy rates we collapsed the items with a confidence rating of 1, 2, 3, or 4 to reflect guessing, accounting for 28.0% of all responses. We assumed that items rated 5, 6, or 7 reflected a moderate level of belief, and those items rated 8, 9, or 10 we assumed to reflect a strong belief. We then recalculated accuracy rates, dropping responses that reflected guessing. This recalculation showed a mean accuracy rate of 35.6% at pretest and 67.6% at posttest. This difference remained significant, F(1, 71) = 211.3, P < .001, eta 2 = .749.
The comparison of overall accuracy to accuracy recalculated to eliminate guessing showed a significant difference at pretest, F(1 , 71) = 9.8, P = .003, eta 2 = .121. There was no signiflicant difference for the posttest comparison.
Strength of Beliefs: How Does Confidence Reconcile with Accuracy?
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA on mean confidence ratings with time (pretest/posttest) and accuracy (correct/incorrect) showed a significant main effect of test time, with significantly higher confidence levels at posttest, F(1, 68) = 32.5, P < .001 , eta 2 = .324. Average confidence was 5.89 at pretest and 6.92 at posttest. There was no significant effect of confidence , based on accuracy. Mean confidence was 6.51 for incorrect responses, and 6.30 for correct responses. However, the interaction was significant, F(1 , 68) = 65.6, P < .001, eta 2 = .491, and showed a greater increase in posttest confidence for correct responses , relative to incorrect responses, whereas at pretest confidence in the incorrect responses was greater than for the correct responses.
What Are the Sources of Misconceptions?
The effect of source of knowledge was analyzed separately for frequency, accuracy, and confidence, for pretest only, because our interest was in the sources of students' misconceptions coming into the introductory course.
How often are the varied sources cited? Participants indicated that they most often did not remember how they learned the information (36.7%), regardless of accuracy. All other sources were indicated about equally often, with 18.9% indicating personal experience, 16.2% media sources, 14.3% in a previous class, and 13.1 % having read about it. We then examined source in terms of the overall percentage of incorrect responses per source, at pretest, as a measure of source of misconceptions. Participants attributed the largest proportion of their incorrect responses (30%) to the "don't know" category, 20% to "media," 19% to "personal experience," 16% to "reading," and 15% to "classroom learning."
We collapsed all pretest responses across sources, based on accuracy rates. Participants who attributed pretest responses to media sources had a 23% accuracy rate , 38% accuracy when the source was personal experience, 25% when having read about it, 35% when having learned the information in a previous class, and 50% indicated that they couldn 't recall where they learned the information.
How is the source related to accuracy? A repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of source, F(4, 140) = 7.3, P < .001, eta 2 = .173.
Planned comparisons using Simes' (1986) correction showed that accuracy based on media sources (24.6%) was significantly lower than for personal experience (40.6%), classroom learning (37.3%), and don't know (49.1 %).
How is the source related to confidence? An ANOVA on mean confidence ratings for all five sources of information showed a main effect of source, F(4, 164) = 36.1, P < .001 , eta 2 = .468. Planned comparisons using Simes' (1986) correction showed that mean confidence in media sources was significantly lower (5.92), compared to personal experience (7.35), reading (7.09) , and classroom learning (7.20), and Significantly greater than for don't know (4.32) . The only other significant differences were between confidence for the 'don't know' response , which was significantly lower than all other sou rces.
Discussion
This study examined the prevalence of misconceptions regarding information in psychology, as well as the effects of strength of beliefs and source ofinformation on this prevalence. The pretest accuracy of 38.97% was somewhat lower than previous findings (e.g., Gardner & Dalsing, 1986; Griggs & Ransdell, 1987; Lamal, 1979; McKeachie, 1960; Vaughn, 1977) that ranged from 41 % to 77% accuracy, using various versions of Vaughn's (1977) Tests of Misconceptions. Our accuracy rate, however, was consistent with other findings (e.g., Gutman, 1979; McCutcheon, 1991; McCutcheon et aI., 1993) of 26% to 35%. These latter studies emphasized misconceptions of relatively recent origin, as did our previous studies examining misconceptions Kowalski et aI., 2002; Taylor et aI., 2000 Taylor et aI., , 2001 .
When we eliminated guessing from the present data, the accuracy rate fell by 2.9%, to 35.6% at pretest. This decline was statistically significant but of low effect size. This result suggests that participants were guessing correctly; however, the overall effect is not very meaningful. Our results are in contrast to Gardner and Dalsing's (1986) findings which indicated a small (7.98%) increase in accuracy of beliefs when guessing was eliminated. PartiCipants in their study selected a "don't know" option for only 12.2% of items. Griggs and Ransdell (1987) , similarly, found a 12% "don't know" response rate. We conclude that guessing has only a modest effect on accuracy, a conclusion consistent with Gardner and Dalsing's, and that overall accuracy rates either with or without an option for guessing provide a relativElly accurate assessment of misconceptions.
The posttest accuracy of 65.97% (67.60% when guessing is eliminated-a nonsignificant difference with low effect size) represents a larger improvement relative to other studies. As reported elsewhere , we attributed this result to targeting specific items in a refutational format during instruction and partly to refining the items in pilot testing. These data suggest that taking an introductory psychology class can meaningfully reduce the number of misconceptions.
The confidence data help to interpret our accuracy data. Previous studies (ct., Lamal, 1995; Vaughn, 1977) suggested that course instruction had a minimal effect on improving students' thinking about scientific psychological information. Our data, however, suggest that with instruction, students not only increased their overall accuracy of beliefs, but also became more confident in the correct beliefs, and less confident when retaining their belief in the misconception. This finding suggests an early change in beliefs when the misconception is not completely given up, because it is no longer held as strongly. Thus, the use of confidence ratings provides evidence that beliefs may be in the process of changing, even when the absolute response suggests no change.
These findings using confidence ratings, as an indicator of strength of belief, concur with findings in the conceptual change literature. Dole and Sinatra (1998) and Limon (2001) suggest that such change tends to be evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. By this they mean that change occurs slowly, with knowledge transformed from one state to another, in stages; massive revisions in prior beliefs are unlikely to occur. Our data support this notion: While many misconceptions seemingly remained unchanged, the decline in overall confidence supports this type of gradual process.
The interpretation of the source of misinformation is a bit more complicated. In support of the frequent finding of source confusion in selfreports , the "don't know where I learned the information" response was most common. Because the plurality of responses supported this finding, we felt confident that the detail and precision of personal experiences and media sources reflected accurate memory for those sources. Wright, Gaskell, and O'Muircheartaigh (1997) provide evidence for the reliability of source information , particularly when it is accompanied by detail and precision in the memory source. Thus, although we can never truly know whether participants were accurate about their remembered sources, we believe that the detail and precision with which they recalled a particular source supported the accuracy of their memory for the source. At best these would then be accurate sources, at worst they could have conceivably reinforced a misconception .
Thus, when considering confidence in information as a function of source, when the source could not be remembered, participants most often noted low confidence , suggesting they were guessing when the source could not be remembered. The highest confidence was in terms of the next two most frequently cited sources of information, "personal experience" and "media."
The planned comparisons suggested that when media was the source of knowledge, the responses were significantly less accurate than for personal experience, class, or don't know. Participants provided the specific media sources of information, whenever possible . This information showed that news reports were listed most often as a specific source of misinformation, followed by prime time news shows (e.g., 60 Minutes, 20/20), prime time fiction, and newspapers, in order. Thus, it appears that individuals acquire incorrect prior knowledge from media sou rces. These individuals may lack critical thinking skills, or may have insufficient prior knowledge, to sift through the misinformation.
The planned comparisons of confidence ratings relative to source of information showed that confidence was significantly lower when information came from media sources. This finding suggests that participants were fairly insightful in doubting the accuracy of knowledge acquired directly from media sources. This use of the confidence ratings is important because it tells us that although the participants may acquire much information from the media, they appear to be cautious about its accuracy.
In summary, we found that misconceptions continue to be prevalent, perhaps even increaSing over the past 10 to 20 years. Nevertheless, taking an introductory psychology course can significantly reduce these misconceptions.
The use of confidence ratings provided an additional understanding of misconceptions. The confidence ratings suggest that at pretest, participants were more confident in their incorrect responses than in their correct responses. At posttest both accuracy and confidence increased. Confidence decreased for items answered incorrectly at both pretest and posttest. Thus, when misconceptions remained, confidence in their accuracy decreased, suggesting a change in belief systems.
In terms of source of information and as could be expected , most participants did not remember exactly where they learned the information . When individuals remembered where they learned their misconceptions , it was primarily from varied media sources. The confidence ratings provided additional insight into the accuracy data because participants were least confident when they learned information from media sources or when they did not remember where they learned the information.
Our findings indicate that teachers of the introductory course, often the only psychology course taken by many students on college campuses across the country, need to be particularly mindful of the na'lve beliefs students bring to class. As Bransford , Brown, and Cocking (2000) note, "If initial ideas are ignored by teachers, students may not develop the understanding teachers intended" (p. 11).
Our goals for future research include looking at the various classroom pedagogies that may be most effective in changing misconceptions. Early analyses based on the developmental metacognitive literature suggest the refutational format is very effective for changing misconceptions. This approach focuses on the use of both refutational text and refutational lectures, directly targeting both the misconception and the evidence that contradicts that misconception . We are optimistic that even a single introductory course in psychology can teach students to think critically about alternatives and to dispel many na'ive and incorrect beliefs about psychology.
